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International investment arbitrations are an upcoming and dynamic factor 
within the current global economy.1 They are well represented in Central Europe, 
which makes this topic even more prominent. They embody a need to protect and 
govern the globalization of international commerce and financial activities. 
International investment arbitrations are characterized by the involvement of a state 
or a state entity and in comparison, to commercial arbitrations, the sovereignty of 
the involved state plays a great role.2  
 
On one hand, a state has rights and obligations to safeguard public interests, 
and on the other hand, such rights and obligations are bounding. International 
investment arbitration is characterized by International Investment Agreements, or 
better known as IIAs, that are to protect both parties involved, a state and an investor 
on another state, that is a party to such agreement. IIAs are treaties that serve to 
protect, promote a liberalize cross-border investments.3 They serve as means of a 
direct right of action for a harmed party, an individual that qualifies as an investor. 
The most common type of IIAs is Bilateral Investment Treaties, BITs.4  
 
States that conclude these BITs are bound to respect standards that arise treaty 
provisions. Such standards are notably “fair and equitable treatment”, “full protection and 
security”, “national treatment”, “most-favored-nation treatment”, “transfer of funds” or the so-
called “umbrella clauses.”5  
 
Damages embody one of the main characteristics of international investment 
arbitrations, the monetary aspect. Until 2015 most of the disputes have arisen from 
the energic sector, with roughly 62%.6 In many cases damages that tribunals award, 
are in outrageous numbers and lack a sufficient basis. The awards can range from a 
                                                 
1 Šturma, p. 175. 
2 Ripinsky, p. 7-8.  
3 Marboe, p. 5-7. 
4 Sabahi, p. 10. 
5 Abdala, p. 221. 
6 Denegri, p. 25.  
 2 
couple of millions of U.S.$ to a couple of billions of U.S.$, such as in Yukos v Russia, 
when the tribunal has awarded U.S.$ 50 billion.7  
 
Moral damages are less frequently awarded, and even though they do not reach 
the sum of billions of U.S.$, they are an impending concept for the development of 
the international investment arbitrations. Deriving from the nature of moral damages 
and their elusiveness, the more focus tribunals shall put into making sure, that no 
moral harm stays without reparation. Otherwise, the perpetrator would be awarded 
for its wrongful conduct.  
 
Since moral damages are such a forthcoming topic, I have decided to focus 
my thesis on bringing more light on this topic. The objective of my thesis is to explain 
the concept of damages and particularly moral damages to a broader public. The 
questions that this thesis shall answer are (1) what the methods of reparation of 
damages are, and (2) what moral damages are and how their methods of reparation 
differ from the general methods. The focus of the thesis shall therefore lay on the 
value and valuation of damages and in particular moral damages.  
 
With the help of the analysis method, the thesis is divided into eight chapters. 
Firstly, the thesis will set the scene with an introduction to the concept of 
international investment arbitrations. After a brief introduction, the thesis will 
examine the damages principles, the compensation, and the value of an investment 
in international investment arbitrations. Following, the thesis will inspect the 
valuation methods that tribunals use to measure the amount of damages, as well as 
methods of reduction of damages. 
 
After a general assessment of damages in international investment 
arbitrations, the thesis will focus on the concept of moral damages. It will examine 
the types of wrongful acts that are compensable by moral damages and the definition 
and types of moral damages. It will touch on the distinction between moral and 
punitive damages. The thesis will furthermore examine the forms of reparation and 
the evolution of awarding moral damages. Second to last, the thesis will inspect the 
                                                 
7 Yukos v Russia, para. 1888.  
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threshold that tribunals pose on moral damages and the valuation of moral damages. 
Lastly, challenges in awarding moral damages will be observed.  
 
1. International Investment Arbitrations 
 
When a breach of these standards happens, state bears responsibility under 
international law. BITs provide protection provisions against “illegal nationalization and 
expropriation of foreign assets and other actions”8 by the host state. Most notably 
expropriation by the host state has always been feared by foreign investors. BITs that 
are concluded to attract foreign investments, therefore need to protect in case of 
political or economic change in leadership or direction, which could lead to seizure 
of foreign investment.9  
 
Expropriation in its nature is deprivation of the enjoyment of property rights, 
which differentiates expropriation from other treatment standards.10 Expropriation 
in itself is allowed under international law and BITs only set conditions for 
expropriation, but do not interfere with the sole right of a state to expropriate. Lastly, 
expropriation is the only treatment standard that contains directions of assessment 
of compensation.11  
 
Legal basis for expropriation arises from so-called Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation Treaties (FCN) that were concluded in the post-World War II era.12 
These treaties have later evolved into now used BITs. The foundation of these 
treaties ascends from the Hull formula that entails a public purpose and “adequate, 
effective and prompt compensation”.13  We can distinguish between direct and indirect 
expropriation. Direct expropriation entails the physical seizure of assets or revenue 
streams. On the other hand, indirect expropriation, which is much more difficult to 
prove, is a decrease in anticipated revenues without seizure of assets or revenue 
                                                 
8 BIT.  
9 Denegri, p. 37. 
10 McLachlan, p. 360-361. 
11 Marboe, p. 18-20. 
12 Ibidem. 
13 Tidewater v. Venezuela, para. 86. 
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streams. In indirect expropriation, the host state does not take over the possession 
or control of the investor’s asset.14 
 
Deriving from the nature of expropriation, we can distinguish lawful and 
unlawful expropriation. In order for the expropriation to be lawful certain criteria 
need to be met. Firstly, the seizure needs to serve a public purpose, secondly, the act 
of expropriation needs to follow due process, thirdly, it needs to be non-
discriminatory and lastly, the State has to pay the investor in question 
compensation.15  
 
The last requirement is questionable. Arbitration tribunals have not agreed on 
whether a compensatory payment is a mandatory requirement, in other words, if the 
sole absence of compensation renders an act of expropriation to be unlawful.16 The 
tribunal in Tidewater v. Venezuela found that “an expropriation wanting only a determination 
of compensation by an international tribunal is not to be treated as an illegal expropriation.”17 
Furthermore, it stated that such lack renders the expropriation as provisionally 
lawful, meaning that a later payment of satisfactory compensation would consider 
the act to be lawful.18 The tribunal in Venezuela Holdings v. Venezuela has arrived at the 
same conclusion, stating that “the mere fact that an investor has not received compensation does 
not in itself render an expropriation unlawful.”19  
 
In opposition, the tribunal in Pezold v. Zimbabwe concluded that since there was 
no compensation paid, the act of expropriation has not fulfilled the criteria of a 
lawful expropriation and therefore determined, that Zimbabwe has expropriated the 
investor in question unlawfully.20 The same conclusion has been stated by the 
tribunal in Unglaube v. Costa Rica.21  
 
                                                 
14 Abdala, p. 105. 
15 Tidewater v. Venezuela, para. 90. 
16 Denegri, p.38.  
17 Tidewater v. Venezuela, para. 140. 
18 Tidewater v. Venezuela, para. 141. 
19 Ibidem. 
20 Von Pezold v. Zimbabwe, para. 497. 
21 Unglaube v. Costa Rica, para. 305. 
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At first sight, the above-mentioned decisions are conflicting, but after a careful 
contemplation, the difference between these decisions is the fact, that in 
both Tidewater v Venezuela and Venezuela Holdings v Venezuela cases the host state has 
been willing to pay compensation, but rather the issue has been the specific amount.22 
Consequently, it could be concluded that the mere absence of payment, in case there 
is the willingness to compensate, should not render automatically an act of 
expropriation to be unlawful.23  The distinction between lawful and unlawful 
expropriation has a significant impact when assessing damages.  
2. Damages principles in International Investment Arbitration 
 
Damages serve harmed party as a recovery rather than a penalty to the 
harming party. The aim of damages is to “wipe out all the consequences of an illegal act”24 
and in order to achieve a full reparation, the international law distinguishes between 
damages at large and mere compensation for lawful expropriation.25  
 
The main difference between damages and compensation is from where they 
derive. Compensation, on one hand, is codified in international treaties, while 
damages derive from arbitral decisions when they are awarded by tribunals.26 
Therefore, a party in unlawful expropriation or harmed by other wrongful act is 
entitled to damages as well as other remedies for example restitution in kind, that are 
not available to a party, which has been lawfully expropriated.27 Such difference 
protects the state itself when distinguishes it’s acts in accordance with their 
lawfulness.28  
 
As mentioned above, damages serve to wipe out all the consequences of an 
illegal act. The full compensation standard is largely connected to the Chorzów factory 
case. Thou the stones of this standard have been set out in the Robinson v. 
                                                 
22 Venezuela Holdings v Venezuela, para. 301, 306. 
23 Trenor, p. 102-104. 
24 Chorzów factory, para. 125. 
25 Ripinsky, p. 4. 
26 McLachlan, p. 414-416. 
27 Ibidem.  
28 Trenor, p. 96. 
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Harman case in 1848 in England.29 This case founded that the intention of damages 
is to provide a harmed party with the required sum of money in order “put the claimant 
back in the position it would have been in had the breach never occurred.”30 Similarly, this view 
has been adopted by French and German law, stipulating the wronged party with 
resources to obtain the comparable position it would have been in if not for the harm 
done.31  
 
Even though full compensation or sometimes known as full reparation 
standard existed before, it is largely intertwined with the Chorzów factory case. This 
case has been brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
1920s. The basis of the claim has been the violation of an international agreement 
and thus the liability for such breach. The merit of the case was based on the 
international agreement between Germany and Poland, in which Germany has 
agreed on transferring the Upper Silesia area to Poland, which in return has agreed 
not to seize any of Germany’s property. Poland has breached this agreement by 
confiscating two German factories. As a result, PCIJ has adjudicated that Poland has 
breach mentioned agreement and that Poland would be liable for such breach and 
any losses suffered by Germany from such breach.32 PCIJ has therefore pronounced 
a full reparation standard stating that:  
 
“… reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the 
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if 
that act had not been committed.”33 
 
Moreover, the Court has articulated the remedies as such: “(1) restitution in kind; 
or if that was not possible, as was the case here, its monetary equivalent“34 and “(2) the award, if 
need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment 
in place of it.“35  
 
                                                 
29 Trenor, p. 113-114. 
30 Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, para. 38.  
31 Trenor, p. 113-114. 
32 Sabahi, p. 47-48. 
33 Chorzów factory, para. 125. 
34 Sabahi, p. 50. 
35 Chorzów factory, para. 175. 
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The standard of full reparation articulated in Chorzów factory has been codified 
into Articles of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. The 
articles opted for „a model of remedial justice as the objective of reparations.“36 In article n.31, 
states are bound to “make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful 
act“.37 Moreover, in article n.36, states are required to “compensate for the damage caused 
thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution.“38  
 
Article n.36, therefore, articulates the Chórzow formula which states: 
 
“Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding 
to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages 
for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place 
of it—such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of 
compensation due for an act contrary to international law.”39 
 
Article 34. then states the various forms of reparation as follow:  
 
“full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall 
take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in 
combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.”40  
 
Firstly, restitution is a form of reparation, that commands restoration of the 
status quo ante, the state as it had been before an internationally wrongful act has been 
committed.41 Restitution is widely acknowledged as the principal remedy in 
international law,42 since it has “the potential to eliminate, legally and materially, the 
consequences of an unlawful act, rather than providing compensation, which is mainly a monetary 
substitute for restitution.”43 
 
                                                 
36 Sabahi, p. 53. 
37 ILC Articles, n. 31. 
38 ILC Articles, n. 36. 
39 Chorzów factory, para. 125. 
40 ILC Articles, n. 34. 
41 USA v Norway, para. 338. 
42 Kantor, p. 52-53. 
43 Sabahi, p. 61. 
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Secondly, compensation is the most used method of reparation in 
international investment arbitrations44, and it will be discussed later in the thesis. 
Lastly, satisfaction, on the contrary, is rarely awarded by tribunals, and serves as a 
mean to repair “non-material” and “non-financial assessable damages.”45 And as such, it will 
be examined in the chapters concerning moral damages. 
 
The tribunal in Vivendi v. Argentina took the Chórzow formula even further and 
ruled, that: 
 
„Based on these principles [of international law], and absent limiting terms in 
the relevant treaty, it is generally accepted today that, regardless of the type of investment, 
and regardless of the nature of the illegitimate measure, the level of damages awarded in 
international investment arbitration is supposed to be sufficient to compensate the 
affected party fully and to eliminate the consequences of the state’s action.“46 
 
In the course of time, other tribunals have applied the full reparation standard 
set by Chorzów factory even outside of the scope of expropriation. For example, the 
tribunal in BG Group v. Argentina has applied the full reparation standard to a breach 
of fair and equitable treatment.47 
 
3. Compensation in International Investment Arbitration 
 
Legal expropriation as mentioned above requires payment of compensation. 
International investment treaties usually pronounce the compensation condition as 
an obligation to pay “just compensation” or “prompt, adequate, and effective compensation”, 
and numerously expressly demand “fair market value” as the measure of that 
compensation.48  
 
                                                 
44 McLachlan, p. 413. 
45 Sabahi, p. 54. 
46 Vivendi v. Argentina, para. 224. 
47 BG Group v. Argentina, para. 413-414.  
48 Trenor, p. 101 
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A prompt compensation demonstrates that it must be reimbursed without 
unreasonable delay. An adequate compensation means equal to the fair market value 
of the seized asset instantly before the seizure. And lastly, effective compensation 
requires that it be made in a freely transferable currency.49  
 
The tribunal in CME v Czech Republic stated that “just compensation” equates with 
a fair market value that represents the genuine value of the property affected.50 The 
standard of “just compensation” is an international standard independent of national 
law.51 “International law requires that compensation eliminates the consequences of the wrongful 
act.”52 Accordingly, “obligation to compensate for the damage caused…shall cover any financially 
assessable damage including loss of profits…”53  
 
The tribunal in ADC v Hungary rendered that a lawful and an unlawful 
expropriation require different treatments. Unlawful expropriations shall be 
subjected to customary international law as established in the Chorzów factory case, and 
not to a compensation provision in BITs.54 In the case, the tribunal held that 
Hungary has expropriated ADC, as it has canceled its airport management contracts. 
Such actions have breached the Hungary–Cyprus BIT’s provisions of public 
purpose, due process of law, non-discrimination, and compensation.55  
 
The tribunal stated that even though BITs are lex specialis and therefore prevail 
over general international law, such rules do not apply for unlawful expropriation56. 
The reasoning behind such decision is the fact that such application would “conflate 
compensation for a lawful expropriation with damages for an unlawful expropriation”.57  
 
Following the tribunal in ADC v Hungary, the tribunal in Siemens v Argentina 
held that:  
 
                                                 
49 USA v Norway, para. 338-340. 
50 CME v Czech Republic, para. 497 
51 Ibidem. 
52 Ibidem. 
53 ILC Articles, n. 36. 
54 ADC v Hungary, para. 480-499. 
55 Sabahi, p. 98. 
56 ADC v Hungary, para. 429-443. 
57 ADC v Hungary, para. 481. 
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“The key difference between compensation under the Draft Articles and the 
Factory at Chorzów case formula, and Article 4(2) of the Treaty is that under the 
former, compensation must take into account ‘all financially assessable damage’ or ‘wipe 
out all the consequences of the illegal act’ as opposed to compensation ‘equivalent to the 
value of the expropriated investment’ under the Treaty.”58  
 
The tribunal in Siag v Egypt upheld the difference between lawful and unlawful 
expropriations, even though it held that such distinction had no practical meaning 
since the award of the market value of the investment was equal under both.59 The 
distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriations was set in two instances in 
Philips Petroleum v Iran. The tribunal there rendered the difference as “(1) whether 
restitution of the property can be awarded, and (2) whether compensation can be awarded for increase 
of the value of the property between the date of the taking and the date of the judicial or arbitral 
decision awarding compensation.“60  
 
4. Value of an investment  
 
A value of an object is generally assessed as a price that would bring in an 
open and competitive market, given by the demand and supply for such object.61 In 
investment arbitrations, tribunals often use the term “fair market value” in connection 
to compensation in expropriation cases. A fair market value would also encompass 
terms such as “genuine”, “actual” or “true.”62 Fair market value is according to 
commentaries to ILC Articles “general basis for assessment of compensation reflecting the 
capital value of property taken or destroyed.”63  
 
A full reparation standard requires that all financially assessable damages be 
compensated. A value or a decrease in a value of investment mostly operates as a 
measure of compensation. However, in some cases, tribunals have rendered 
                                                 
58 Siemens v Argentina, para. 352. 
59 Siag v Egypt, para. 541. 
60 Philips Petroleum v Iran, para. 122. 
61 Price.  
62 Ripinsky, p. 183. 
63 ILC commentaries to Article n.36, para. 22. 
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compensation in addition to the value or the decrease in value of an investment, such 
as moral damages awarded besides a loss of value of an investment.64  
 
Thus, there is a need that the tribunals quantify damages with the type of the 
breached obligation in mind. Different obligations require different valuations. Cases 
of unlawful expropriation shall be decided based on the value of the investment, 
parallelly to the treaty provisions on lawful expropriation.65 As far as infringements 
of relative standards, for example, fair and equitable treatment, the method of the 
value of the investment is less proper.  A breach of fair and equitable treatment 
demands widespread judicial analysis of the State’s sovereign behavior.66  
 
Tribunals use various measures of a value of an investment, primarily lost 
profits and investment expenditures. As to the investment expenditures, tribunals 
employ investment expenditures as (1) head of damage, (2) damnum emergens and 
lucrum cessans or (3) fair market value.67  
 
Before allowing investment expenditures to be used in order to the assess 
value of an investment, the tribunal needs to evaluate the eligibility of such expenses. 
The eligibility of expenses comprises (1) a link with the investment, (2) a link with 
the investor, (3) reasonability, and (4) sufficient evidence.68  
 
Firstly, there shall be a link between the expenses and the investment, meaning 
that the expenses need to be sustained for the purpose of a particular investment 
venture.69 Secondly, there shall be a link between the expenses and the investor. This 
would mean that any losses that an investor can prove shall be compensated.70 
Thirdly, the expanses shall not be unreasonable, unnecessary, or excessive. 
According to the tribunal in Himpurna this demonstrates that “as long as the expenditures 
were made in rational pursuit of the objectives of the Contract, there is no room to question their 
                                                 
64 Ripinsky, p. 262-263. 
65 Reghizzi, p. 62. 
66 Reghizzi, p. 62. 
67 Ripinsky, p. 264-266. 
68 Ripinsky, p. 266. 
69 MTD v Chile, para. 239. 
70 Ibidem. 
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cost-effectiveness ex post facto.”71 And lastly, there shall be sufficient evidence. The 
requirement of the proof of the expenses is borne by the Claimant. The evidence 
such as “in general, contemporaneous books and record of a company regularly kept in normal 
course of business”72 shall according to Biloune be substantial. 
 
As to which of the mentioned investment expenditures to use the tribunal in 
Himpurna stated the following: 
 
“when awarding compensation for expropriated business ventures, there is 
generally no basis to apply the contractual reliance damages (damnum emergens), but 
only the expectancy damages (lucrum cessans). An undertaking has been expropriated; 
the prejudice suffered by its former owner is simply the worth of the venture as a going 
concern. That worth is crystallised in an analysis which discounts the future revenue 
stream of the enterprise to establish its present value. Leaving aside special considerations 
justifying higher recovery in the case of wrongful expropriation, there is no separate 
evaluation of sunk costs, whether or not represented by physical assets.”73 
 
As far as fair market value is applied, in expropriation cases, it is closely linked 
to the discounted cash flow method and lost profits. Fair market value has been 
defined by the tribunal in CMS v Argentina as: 
 
“the price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which property would 
change hands between a hypothetical willing and able buyer and a hypothetical willing 
and able seller, acting at arms [sic] length in an open and unrestricted market, when 
neither is under compulsion to buy or sell and when both have reasonable knowledge of 
the relevant facts.”74 
 
The fair market value, therefore, does not represent the value of the asset at 
any particular given moment but rather embodies the worth of such asset on the 
market.75  
                                                 
71 Himpurna, para. 241. 
72 Biloune, para. 223-224. 
73 Himpurna, para. 241. 
74 CMS v Argentina, para. 402.  
75 Sabahi, p. 103. 
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To calculate fair market value tribunals can use various methods, preferably 
based on the type of the business or asset in question and other criteria. The nature 
of the value property dictates which method of valuation would be better suited for 
the particular type of asset.76 In a case of a tangible asset, such as gold, the method 
of valuation will differ from a case where the asset is intangible, such as social media. 
With that, the question of the state of the investment is closely intertwined. The 
tribunal needs to evaluate whether an asset is a going concern with future prospects 
or whether the asset is no longer viable and is in liquidation.77  
 
The most significant principle in practice is the range of accessible information 
that tribunals can obtain, as well as at what time which information is available to 
them. “The valuation of a business requires in-depth knowledge of the company and the industry 
in which it operates.”78 Additionally, tribunals need to apply a professional judgment 
when choosing the most suitable valuation factors.  
 
And lastly, the choice of a valuation method simply depends on the discretion 
of the particular tribunal. It is up to each tribunal to decide what method suits the 
case the most taking into consideration all the available information. When exercising 
discretion, tribunals shall be directed by “equitable considerations without thereby assuming 
the role of aritrators ex aequo et bono.”79 Tribunals can modify the quantum of equity 
depending on the relevant circumstances, such as an intensity of the State’s breach80, 
whether the State acted in good or bad faith81, a possible enrichment82, or the 
economic conditions of the host State.83 
 
Apart from investment expenditures, the value of an investment can be 
assessed by lost profit. Lost profit in investment arbitrations can mean different 
things. The term can be used as a reference to cash flow, the lost past profits 
                                                 
76 Sabahi, p. 107-108. 
77 Rumeli Telekom, para. 803.  
78 Blum, p. 2.  
79 Tecmed v Mexico, para. 190. 
80 Sabahi, p. 1056. 
81 Techniques v Poland, para. 2. 
82 Dolzer, p. 289. 
83 Reghizzi, p. 64.  
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(meaning from a date of a breach until date of an award), or the lost future profits 
(meaning subsequent to an award.)84 
 
In claims of contract breaches, that do not entail expropriation, the tribunals 
most often calculate the value of the losses on the base of the loss of profits or 
consequential liability to a third party.85 In such case, the tribunal would not take into 
consideration the alternative of capital expenditure. Nevertheless, in some 
contractual violations tribunals have considered both capital expenditure for the 
failure to supply the goods and the loss of profits.86  
 
In order for the tribunal to calculate lost profits, it needs to determine whether 
or not the lost profits are recoverable. In order for the damages to be recoverable, 
there needs to be a “reasonable degree of certainty”87 and they “cannot be recovered for an 
uncertain loss.”88 The Amoco tribunal noted that “one of the best settled rules of the law on 
international responsibility of States is that no reparation for speculative or uncertain damages can 
be awarded.”89 Therefore, a claim for lost profits shall be accompanied by a reasonable 
degree of certainty that the Claimant would have been able to make those lost profits, 
not for the wrongful act.90 That implies, the Claimant is not obliged to present a 
precise valuation of lost profits.  
 
Besides recoverable, the lost profits need to be foreseeable. The tribunal in 
Micula v Romania had proposed a test, that would indicate whether or not the lost 
profits are recoverable and foreseeable. Claimants must demonstrate that:  
 
“(1) were engaged in a profit-making activity (or, at the very least, that there is 
sufficient certainty that they had engaged or would have engaged in a profit-making 
activity but for the revocation of the incentives), and  
                                                 
84 Clayton, para. 12-14, 37.  
85 Pryles, p. 5. 
86 Pryles, p. 5. 
87 Ripinsky, p. 164. 
88 Ibidem.   
89 Amoco, para. 238. 
90 Ripinsky, p. 281. 
 15 
(2) that that activity would have indeed been profitable (at the very least, that 
such profitability was probable).”91 
 
Three main types of recoverable loss of profits can be distinguished. First, 
there is the loss of profits that is a result of “the temporary loss of use and enjoyment of the 
income-producing asset.”92 In such case, the tribunal in LG&E v. Argentina stated that 
the compensation equals “the income to which the claimant was entitled by virtue of undisturbed 
ownership."93 Such income is assessed thru a period in which the Claimant had lost it.  
 
Second, there is a loss of profits connected to “unlawful taking of income-producing 
property.”94 In this type, in comparison to the first type of loss of profits, the tribunal 
questions the property title to the asset. The compensation in this type usually 
encompasses the losses suffered in between the moment of expropriation and 
settlement of the dispute.95  
 
And lastly, there is a loss of profits associated with concessions and further 
contractually protected interests.96 In this type, the tribunal awards the compensation 
for lost profits estimated after the date of award till extinguishing the right.97  
 
As far as calculations of lost profits go, there are various modalities of 
compensation for lost profits. These modalities arise from the different meanings of 
the term lost profit. Hence, lost profits can function to measure a fair market value 
of a business, primarily when applying the discounted cash flow method. They can 
serve as a type of compensation for losses of business opportunities, as well as to 
shield business interruptions, periods of time with less profit than normally. Lost 
profit, in the meaning of lucrum cessans, may even pair with damnum emergens to provide 
full reparation standard.98 
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5. Valuation methods 
 
Now when we examined the value of an investment, we can apply that 
knowledge to examine the valuation of damages. To calculate damages there are 
various valuation methods used. There are no rules concerning requirements to use 
a certain method of valuation in customary law or treaty-based standards, therefore 
it is up to the tribunal to consider, which of the following valuation method is most 
suitable for the particular case.  
 
Main valuation methods are: (1) Income-based approach, (2) Market-based 
approach, and (3) Asset-based approach. Besides these main methods, tribunals 
sometimes allow other methods or a mixture of the main methods.99  
 
Before the application of either of these methods, it is vital to evaluate the 
specific circumstances of the particular case. The tribunal must outline the basis of 
valuation, together with the premises regarding the valuation procedure. The tribunal 
often bases its valuation upon the submission of either of the parties to the dispute, 
however, the tribunal is bound by its own valuation of the circumstances and at the 
end, it shall assess the damages according to its best knowledge.100  
 
The valuation is influenced by various standards, such as fair market value or 
full reparation standard. Fair market value entails that the price upon which a 
hypothetical willing buyer and a hypothetical willing seller would agree is 
conclusive.101 Full reparation standard, as deliberated above, demands that the 
injured party is put in the financial position he or she would be in if the unlawful act 
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5.1. Income-based approach 
 
Income-based method reflects the ability of an asset to produce profit. The 
income-based method can mean one of three methods, DCF method, adjusted 
present value method, or capitalized cash flow method.103 The DCF method, the 
most commonly used method, stands for discounted cash flow method. The DCF 
method operates with future expected cash flow that is converted to a single current 
capital value.104  
 
Since the DCF method relies on a prediction of future revenue, an extensive 
collection of information on the future expected cash flow, including past and 
present data, is needed. The prediction of future revenue has to be credible in order 
to obtain its reasonableness and lack of contradiction. This prediction is based on a 
thorough analysis of the current and future market in which the valued business 
operates, the specific industry’s economic conditions, and as well as the financial and 
competition conditions.105 Such evaluation shall use an appropriate discount rate, 
that entails (1) the time value of money106 and (2) the risk connected to the expected 
cash flow.107 The most notably used discount rate is the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital (WACC) which is based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).108  
 
The fact that the DFC method is based on future expected cash flow deems 
it to be contended as speculation. In order to avoid speculative calculations, the 
tribunal needs to evaluate whether the particular case is based on adequate data.109 
Tribunal stated in Rusoro Mining that the DCF method works if “there are reliable 
projections of its future cash flow.”110 Moreover, the tribunal in CME v Czech Republic 
decided that in order to use the DCF method there needs to be “continuing value” of 
the company based on expected cash flows growing at a constant rate after the 
forecast period.111  
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The tribunal in Rusoro Mining established important steps to evaluate the 
application of the DCF method. It stated, that the DCF approach cannot be applied 
to all sorts of situations, and while in some businesses it provides effective 
assessments, in other cases it is inapplicable. “DCF works properly if all, or at least a 
significant part, of the following criteria are met:  
(1) The enterprise has an established historical record of financial performance;  
(2) There are reliable projections of its future cash flow, ideally in the form of a detailed 
business plan adopted in tempore insuspecto, prepared by the company’s officers and 
verified by an impartial expert;  
(3) The price at which the enterprise will be able to sell its products or services can be 
determined with reasonable certainty;  
(4) The business plan can be financed with self-generated cash, or, if additional cash is 
required, there must be no uncertainty regarding the availability of financing;  
(5) It is possible to calculate a meaningful WACC, including a reasonable country risk 
premium, which fairly represents the political risk in the host country;  
(6) The enterprise is active in a sector with low regulatory pressure, or, if the regulatory 
pressure is high, its scope and effects must be predictable: it should be possible to 
establish the impact of regulation on future cash flows with a minimum of 
certainty.”112  
5.1.1. Going concern 
 
The tribunal in Total v. Argentina accepted the DCF method as the most 
appropriate way to determine the fair market value of a going concern.113 Going 
concern value is a widely used term. Many tribunals in defining this term adhere to 
the definition that the World Bank has offered as such:  
 
“an enterprise consisting of income-producing assets which has been in operation 
for a sufficient period of time to generate the data required for the calculation of future 
income and which could have been expected with reasonable certainty, if the taking had 
                                                 
112 Rusoro Mining, para. 759. 
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not occurred, to continue producing legitimate income over the course of its economic life 
in the general circumstances following the taking by the State.“114 
 
However, there is no generally upheld threshold defining a “sufficient period of 
time” and the criterion is often arbitrary and not rooted in economics.115 The tribunals 
evaluate individual disputes on a case-by-case basis, considering numerous factors 
when deciding on whether such threshold was met.  
 
The tribunal in Amoco has stated that in order to ascertain a going concern, 
one has to substantiate that “an undertaking … had demonstrated a certain ability to earn 
revenues and was, therefore to be considered as keeping such ability for the future.”116 Tribunal 
thus shifted from focusing on the liquidation of an investment to its profitability in 
defining the ongoing concern value. 
 
The tribunal in Takavoli v Iran has stated this alteration and acknowledged that:  
 
“[i]n accounting terms, the phrase going concern generally describes a company 
that ‘can continue to trade, e.g., has adequate funds for doing so’ … In the Tribunal’s 
practice, however, the term ‘going concern’ generally has been used in a less technical 
sense. In determining whether a company is a going concern, the Tribunal generally 
examines whether the company had begun operations by the date of its expropriation 
and, if it had, whether it had a reasonable prospect of being able to continue its 
operations after the Revolution.”117 
 
To avoid awarding speculative damages tribunals rejected the DCF method 
when concluded that the business in question was not a going concern. Some 
tribunals have rejected the usage of the DCF method when the business in question 
has not been built or completed, for example in Levitt v. Iran.118 Others, though, 
rejected the notion, that prevents compensation to a business that has not been 
operating for a sufficient period of time that would allow to establish a history of 
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cash flow, as long as there is a satisfactory amount of data to allow reliable projections 
of the cash flow.119 Consequently, the tribunal in Gold Reserve v. Venezuela, has 
awarded damages even though the mine in question has never been exploiting any 
minerals. The tribunal determined that the mining industry was one, that had enough 
data and therefore allowed the calculation of damages.120  
 
Similarly, the tribunal in Rumeli Telekom v. Kazakhstan has allowed the usage of 
the DCF method, even though concluded that the asset in question, 
telecommunication services, did not fall under the “going concern” definition. The 
harmed party has lacked a consistent presence that would permit to generate 
necessary information for calculating the future profits. Nevertheless, the tribunal 
sustained the DCF method stating, that due to the direct link between the asset and 
its potential to generate profit, the tribunal could not find a suitable alternative 
method.121  
 
Consequently, the appropriate use of the DCF method depends on the nature 
of valued business and assets.122 If the valued business and assets are those that allow 
reliable calculations of lost profit, the tribunal can therefore consider the DCF 
method.  
 
Additionally, tribunals consider if a business is going concern on the basis of 
whether the profitability endured for numerous years. The tribunal in Asian 
Agricultural stated that at least two or three years is the minimum period needed to 
establish continuing business connections, in other words for a company to be 
considered as going concern.123 Similarly decided the tribunal in the case of 
Metalclad.124  
 
However, the ruling of the tribunals in Asian Agricultural and Metalclad should 
be subjected to further consideration of the particular nature of the valued 
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investment. The threshold stated in Asian Agricultural cannot be used in all cases, 
since not all investments are the same. In Asian Agricultural, the main assets affected 
were the shrimps destroyed on the shrimp farm by the local rebels.125 However, in a 
case, where Claimants’ intangible assets are of sale of advertising space and 
promotional content on their feed, the investment is much more difficult to evaluate. 
In other cases, the tribunal refrained from imposing a fixed extent of time, and have 
simply referred to the World Bank Guidelines, and their definitions of going 
concern.126 
 
5.1.2. Discount rate 
 
The tribunal in Amoco described that the DCF method discounts the projected 
future cash flow to its present value by applying the discount rate.127 Weighted 
average cost of capital (“WACC”) represents the average cost of raising funds from 
shareholders and lenders operating in the same industry as the damaged company.128 
The costs of raising funds from a lender are measured by interest rate, also called the 
cost of debt, and the interest rate related to raising funds from shareholders is called 
the cost of equity. WACC estimates the risk of future cash flows while considering 
the interest rate of both lenders and shareholders.  
 
The key factor in the making up of the WACC is the country risk premium, 
which estimates how much riskier is investing in a country compared to “a safe 
country”. Country risk refers to the risk created by country-specific aspects, it may 
include business risks (such as macroeconomic factors, financial market factors, or 
local demand/supply factors)129 and political risks (such as expropriation, tax and 
policy alterations, comprising currency convertibility, political violence such as civil 
war, mass strikes, and civil strife).130  
 
                                                 
125 Asian Agricultural, para. 3. 
126 World Bank Guidelines. 
127 Amoco, para. 238. 
128 Kantor p. 159.  
129 Ripinsky, p. 326. 
130 Abdala, p. 221. 
 22 
The higher the country risk rate, the higher the WACC, and therefore, the 
lower the damages calculated.131 Thomas Stauffer warned against the so-called 
“Cinderella effect”, which occurs when a party deliberately overvalues its assets and 
undervalues the country risk rate to achieve a more advantageous result from the 
DCF method.132 
 
There is debate on whether to include country risk reflecting possible unlawful 
state behavior or not. When talking about risks related to unlawful state conduct, 
“discounting the value of the investment in light of the prospect of such conduct is arguably in tension 
with the raison d’être of the investment treaty itself.”133 Hence, some tribunals have omitted 
the presence of an unlawful state action from the discount rate in order to prevent a 
possible windfall to the state. The tribunal in Gold Reserve stated that “it is not 
appropriate to increase the country risk premium to reflect the market’s perception that a State might 
have a propensity to expropriate investments in breach of BIT obligations.”134 
 
However, others viewed these steps as allowing the windfall to the investor.135 
The tribunals in cases involving Venezuela have assumed this approach and 
therefore, encompassed distinctive sums of “confiscation risk” when calculating the 
country risk.136 Thus the disagreement, tribunals have in some cases applied different 
discount rates for the same country. For example, in the case of Venezuela, the 
tribunal in OI Group has assessed the country risk premiums to 6%, whereas the 
tribunal in Tidewater v Venezuela to nearly 15%.137 
 
As mentioned above, the country risk rate or discount rate serves the purpose 
of decreasing the level of speculation and asserting some degree of certainty and 
business sense in the calculations. The raw lost profits calculated from the past 
records of performance in the DCF method are from their very nature speculative, 
nevertheless, they are subjected to the country risk rate established from political 
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risk, tax and currency risk, banking sector risk, economic structure risk and other.138 
Means to combat awarding speculative damages that tribunal can use is amending 
the discount rate used in the DCF method’s calculations. The DCF method is 
inherently speculative, however, the speculation can be dealt with by implementing 
the aforementioned measures. More on the bar of speculative damages below.  
 
5.2. Market-based approach 
 
The second widely used method to calculate damages is the market-based 
approach. The market-based approach works with a comparison of the valuated 
company with a similar business, business ownership interests, securities, or 
intangible assets that have been sold.139 From these businesses, the tribunal compares 
either an equivalent item or an equivalent transaction. The market-based method also 
operates with share prices of publicly traded companies. These stock prices are a 
reliable and impartial guide, although some stock prices do not automatically reflect 
the real value of an asset and are subjected to volatility, that not only depends on 
economic circumstances.140  
 
The tribunal in Yukos v. Russia established it had “a measure of confidence” on the 
grounds of accessible stock market indexes, hence it applied the market-based 
method instead of applying the DCF method based on less reliable facts of the 
case.141 Some tribunals have contemplated, that comparing investments based on the 
very same basis is exceptionally convincing evidence of the fair market value of these 
assets.142  
 
On the other hand, it has been perceived that the market-based approach 
works better as a method to evaluate the precision of other methods, rather than a 
principal method to calculate damages. The tribunal in Tenaris v. Venezuela noted the 
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difficulty to identify companies that are actually comparable and therefore rejected 
the use of the market-based approach.143  
 
However, the tribunal in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia held that it is difficult to 
conceive more concrete evidence of the supposed value of expropriated assets than 
a sale operation relating the same asset 16 days after the date of the expropriation. 
Therefore, the tribunal applied the market-based method, considering the sale 
operation that involved the same asset to evaluate the fair market value. 144  
 
5.3. Asset-based approach 
 
Thirdly, an asset-based method or else know as the cost approach is based on 
assessing value to the different constituents of the valued business. It operates with 
either a book value or a replacement value.145 This actively demonstrates, that all 
these components are revalued to their current values. The difference between 
revalued assets and revalued liabilities then constitutes the final value of the business. 
Since the method is based on comparing assets and liabilities, it is considered to be 
less speculative and easier, and therefore is used in the circumstances that the part 
record or the future profit is too ambiguous.146  
 
The tribunal in South American Silver stated that the Cost-based method is being 
used when the businesses are not going concerns, or when there is an insufficiently 
solid basis on which to calculate profits or growth (in this case the business plan), or 
when the estimation of future cash flows would be completely speculative.147  
 
Moreover, the tribunal in Copper Mesa Mining decided to use the valuation 
method of proven expenditure, rather than seeking to value loss of chance.148 The 
asset-based method has been also applied for example by the tribunal in Oil Field of 
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Texas Inc v. Iran. Since that it has been criticized for disregarding that investments are 
often valued more than the bare value of their assets.149 
 
5.4. Other approaches 
 
In cases that the tribunal does not adhere to the three previously mentioned 
methods, it can choose another method particular to the case in question. The 
tribunal in Saipem v. Bangladesh based its calculations of damages on a previously 
assessed arbitration award.150 The tribunal in Occidental Exploration v. Ecuador has 
valued damages on the base of tax refunds not reimbursed to the harmed party.151  
 
Besides these particular methods, tribunals have occasionally applied a 
combination of the three principal methods. The mixture of asset-based method and 
the income-based method comes from the principles of damnum emergens  and lucrum 
cessans, which applied to a case renders a tribunal the opportunity to assess fixed 
assets by their costs or substitute value and add an estimate of future profits.152 The 
tribunal in LIAMCO v Libya has taken into evaluation not only the book value of the 
business but also added a valuation of risks taken by LIAMCO in their pioneer works 
and subsequent activities.153 The issue with this approach is the fact, that the asset-
based method and the income-based method view distinctively the value of an asset, 
and therefore are substitutes and should not be applied together.154  
 
Another possible mixture of methods is to combine market-based approach 
and income-based approach. Such mixture has been presented to the tribunal in 
Crystallex v Venezuela. The tribunal in Crystallex v Venezuela has taken into 
consideration two distinctive approaches put forward by the Claimants, the stock 
market approach and the market multiples approach. In the tribunal’s view, these 
two methods most reliably project Claimant’s losses. 155  
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Similarly, the tribunal in Rusoro Mining has merged the market-based approach 
and the income-based approach. It stated, that due to Venezuela’s policies distressing 
the gold sector, the best approach to valuating the damages Rusoro Mining suffered 
would be to combine a weighted combination of the remaining three valuations: it 
weighted the maximum market valuation at 25 %, the book valuation at 25 %, and 
the adjusted investment valuation at 50%.156 
 
6. Principles of reduction of damages 
 
Besides banning speculative damages, tribunals can rely on other methods to 
control the amount of damages awarded, such as causal link, foreseeability, 
mitigation, and ban of double recovery.157 
 
6.1. Ban against speculative damages 
 
The DCF method will always be to some degree speculative. However, experts 
note that there is always uncertainty associated with valuation and that it is unrealistic 
to expect or demand absolute certainty from such process. The party seeking 
damages has to prove, but not an absolute certainty, but a rather reasonable certainty, 
the existence of damages.158 In such evidencing, the harmed party shall not be 
penalized for willful actions of the other party that might have resulted in lowering 
its probability to prove damages with more certainty. Tribunals in most cases have 
agreed that the requirement of reasonable certainty shall apply only on the fact of 
damages and not to its amount.159 
 
Legal systems generally reject damages that are too speculative.160 The tribunal 
in BG Group v. Argentina stated that “an award of damages, which are speculative, would run 
afoul the full reparation principle.”161 Moreover, the tribunal in ADM v Mexico noted that 
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“the tribunal must avoid speculative benefits in its damage calculations.”162 For example, the 
tribunal in Amoco affirmed the rule of the law of international responsibility of States 
that “no reparation for speculative or uncertain damage can be awarded.” As far as lost profits 
are concerned, the tribunal in Autopista found that “the existence and amount of lost profits 
must be established with a sufficient degree of certainty and thus cannot be remote, uncertain or 
speculative. “163  
 
Another technique of combating speculative damages is awarding 
compensation for lost opportunity accounting for the probability that the harmed 
party would have received profit from the lost opportunity in question. That means, 
that in case the tribunal concluded that the harmed party only had 60% chance of 
winning a bid, the harmed party would not be awarded with 100% of the lost profit, 
but only those 60%.164 This practice has been applied for example by the tribunal in 
Sapphire Petroleum.165  
 
The tribunal in Bosca v. Lithuania operated also with the concept of lost 
opportunity, however, established that the lost opportunity relates only to a right to 
recover direct damages, for example, the capital spent on the investment, and not to 
compensation of probability of the future investment.166 
 
The degree of speculation and uncertainty can be dealt with by taking 
conservative estimates of cash flow projections and application of higher discount 
rate. Mr. Pryles writes that “difficulty of assessment of damages is not a bar to recovery”.167 
Similarly, in the case of SPP v Egypt, the tribunal stated that the fact that damages 
cannot be assessed with absolute certainty does not preclude awarding damages 
when a loss has been incurred.168 Generally, the underlying argument is that 
Respondent as the Party causing the breach, should not benefit from its violations 
by overly relying on the uncertainty argument. Professor Gotanda and Professor 
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Ripinsky even asked that “to what extent a claimant should be penalized by a legal standard 
when a breach has been found to have occurred.”169  
 
6.2. Causal link 
 
Causation is a vital part of quantification of damages since solely damages 
caused can be recovered.170 Besides factual causation, the tribunal needs to find that 
the harmful act influenced in some form the existence of damages. Therefore, a legal 
connection between a wrongful act and damages needs to be established.171 The ILC 
Commentary explains that “tribunals have been reluctant to provide compensation 
for claims with inherent speculative elements.”172  
 
The tribunal in Amoco stated that “one of the best settled rules of the law of international 
responsibility of States is that no reparation for speculative or uncertain damage can be awarded.”173 
The tribunals in RSM and in Flemingo stated that a causal link between the breach and 
the loss is required.174 Similarly, the tribunal in Gavrilović rejected the claim for lost 
business opportunities, because it found no causal link between the alleged BIT 
breaches and the claimed damages.175  
 
Moreover, the tribunal in S.D. Myers v Canada ruled that “damages may only be 
awarded to the extent that there is a sufficient causal link between the breach of a specific NAFTA 
provision and the loss sustained by the investor.“176 It stated that the causal link in other 
words means that “the harm must not be too remote, or that the breach of the specific NAFTA 
provision must be the proximate cause of the harm.”177  
 
The tribunal, furthermore, overrode the term “foreseeability“ as is used by 
contractual law to constraint the range of recoverability and it underlined that the 
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emphasis ought to be on causation instead of on foreseeability. The tribunal 
additionally debated the appropriation of the distinction between direct or indirect 
damages and concluded that in its place the tribunal should focus on the term 
remoteness.178  
 
Lastly, the tribunal deliberated the evidence and burden of proof, on hand in 
relation to the existence of damages and on the other hand in connection to their 
value. The tribunal in Lemire v Ukraine stated the following:  
 
“The Tribunal agrees that it is a commonly accepted standard for awarding 
forward looking compensation that damages must not be speculative or uncertain, but 
proved with reasonable certainty; the level of certainty is unlikely, however, to be the 
same with respect to the conclusion that damages have been caused, and the precise 
quantification of such damages. Once causation has been established, and it has been 
proven that the in bonis party has indeed suffered a loss, less certainty is required in 
proof of the actual amount of damages; for this latter determination Claimant only needs 
to provide a basis upon which the Tribunal can, with reasonable confidence, estimate 




The principle of foreseeability requires that the harmed party shall be 
compensated only for the damages it could have foreseen. Various legal systems 
oblige the foreseeability from different moments of time, French and English law 
look at the moment of execution of a contract, German law looks at the moment of 
breach of such contract.180  
 
In international investment arbitrations, foreseeability represents that the 
harmed party “cannot recover damages in respect of a loss that he ought to have avoided.”181 
Hence, a failure to fulfill such duty could provoke consequences when assessing the 
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quantity damages.182 According to the ILC commentaries, damages that are too 
“remote” or “consequential to be subject of reparation” shall not be awarded. The same 




The duty to mitigate is generally recognized in international investment 
arbitration as a form of proximate causation. The duty to mitigate “is a general principle 
of international law that a party injured by the non-performance of another contract party must seek 
to mitigate the damage he has sustained.”184 Even if, the duty to mitigate is not contained 
in BITs, the tribunal in Middle East Cement rendered that:  
 
„this duty can be considered to be part of the General Principles of Law which, 
in turn, are part of the rules of international law which are applicable in this dispute 
according to Art. 42 of the ICSID Convention.“185 
 
This principle is not a legal obligation, even though it is regularly articulated 
as a “duty to mitigate”, and therefore, it does not give rise to responsibility by itself. It 
is more along the lines of a failure to mitigate by the harmed party might impede 
recovery to the extent the harmed party could have reasonably mitigated the 
consequences.186 The tribunal shall consider the reasonableness of the duty to 
mitigate based on the information the harmed party had at a given time.187 
 
6.5. Double recovery 
 
It is a well-established principle that double recovery, also referred to as 
enrichessement sans cause, is prohibited.188 The tribunal in Sempra articulated the problem 
of double recovery as “on the one hand, the compensation which the investor would receive as a 
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result of arbitration, and, on the other hand, the compensation which the company would receive in 
the context of a renegotiated adjustment of tariffs or some other mechanism.“189   
 
The tribunal in Venezuela Holdings noted, “that it has the capacity to render an award 
tailored so as to minimize the risk of double recovery between the parties.“190 The tribunal in 
Himpurna stated that: “Had there been no expropriation, past investment would have been 
recovered through subsequent revenues.”191  
 
Tribunals have various resources that can avoid double recovery, as noted in 
Sempra.192 Firstly, the tribunal in Lauder decided that since the Claimant, a Czech 
company CME, has brought up two cases, Lauder v Czech Republic and CME v Czech 
Republic, with the same factual background, it would leave the definitive decision on 
the amount of damages to the second tribunal.193 Secondly, the solution would be to 
eliminate reflective loss claims of ITA system, in preventing multiple claims and 
controlling reflective losses.194  
 
The last option, thou controversial, has been presented by the tribunal in CMS 
v Argentina. The tribunal there compelled the Government to gain the investor’s 
stocks. This would benefit the Government as a stakeholder once the company 
regained the direct losses.195 The issue, that the tribunal in Gami v Mexico latter had 
with such decision, is that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction to force a state into such 
approach. Additionally, the Tribunal rejected such approach since it would not allow 
for the genuine worth of the stocks supposedly reduced.196 
7. Valuation date 
 
The valuation date is of a great impact on the assessment of damages in a case. 
Theoretically, expropriation and compensation for such expropriation should 
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happen at the same time. In reality that is merely impossible. There are various dates 
that the tribunal can take into consideration, such as the date of a relevant act of the 
state or the date of an award. When using the date of the relevant act, ex ante 
approach, the harmed party will be awarded the cost of the investment at the time 
of the seizure, amended by a suitable interest rate at the time of the final award.197 
 
In expropriation cases, the tribunals are most likely to incline to pick the date 
when the expropriation occurred or when it has been known publicly.198 These dates 
are encompassed in most BITs. For example, the tribunal in South American Silver has 
assessed the damages according to the  Article n.5 of the Bolivia-United Kingdom 
BIT, which states that: 
 
“Such compensation shall amount to the market value of the investment 
expropriated immediately before the expropriation or before the impeding expropriation 
became publicly known, whichever is the earlier, …”199 
 
These standards apply to lawful expropriation, hence they at least have to 
apply to unlawful expropriation, since the standards shall not be lowered when a 
breach of law occurs. The tribunal in Amoco rationalized that unlawful expropriation 
permits the harmed party to:  
 
“Damages equal to the greater of (i) the value of the undertaking at the date of 
loss (… including lost profits), judged on the basis of information available as of that 
date, and (ii) its value (likewise including lost profits) as shown by its probable 
performance subsequent to the date of loss and prior to the date of the award, based on 
actual post-taking experience, plus (in either alternative) any consequential 
damages.“200 
 
Subsequently, the tribunal in Phillips Petroleum declared that the division 
between lawful and unlawful expropriations rendered in Chorzów factory shall be 
“relevant only to two possible issues: whether restitution of the property can be awarded and whether 
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compensation can be awarded for any increase in the value of the property between the date of the 
taking and the date of the judicial or arbitral decision awarding compensation.“201 
 
The issue arises when assessing indirect expropriation. In such cases “the law 
of state responsibility provides that the breach occurs when the action or omission occurs which, taken 
with the other actions or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful act.“202  
 
The BITs furthermore assess the payments of the compensation as prompt, 
without delay, effectively realizable, and freely transferable. It shall be paid promptly 
at the time of the expropriation in order to permit only the information available at 
the time of the expropriation to be taken into consideration.203  
 
The ILC Articles, on the other hand, operate with the date of the award to 
assess the damages. In the ex post approach, the harmed party will be awarded the 
cost of the investment at a later date, mostly corresponds to the date of the award.204 
This is implied from Article n.36 and Article n.37. Article n.36 states that the total 
sum of compensation following a breach of international law shall encompass “any 
financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established“ and  “insofar as 
such damage is not made good by restitution”.205 Article n.37 renders restitution as the 
primary remedy of satisfaction for the injury caused by an internationally wrongful 
act.206  
 
Establishing the right date of valuation has real tangible consequences. The 
asset or business being valued can dramatically change its value after the date of the 
expropriation. Both parties to dispute hold, logically, interests in assessing the 
damages as low and as high as possible. Therefore, the tribunal needs to carefully 
consider which date it chooses as the base for valuation.  
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The tribunals in Amoco and other Iran–US cases, where the value of the 
investment has drastically decreased or even disappeared, had to establish the 
valuation date as close to the date of the expropriation as possible.207 However, there 
have been cases where the value of the investment has risen since the date of the 
expropriation. The tribunal in ADC v Hungary was the first that rendered that since 
the worth of the investment has increased since the date of the expropriation, the 
standard rising from the ILC Articles needs to be applied. Therefore, the tribunal 
awarded the Claimant damages valued to the date of the award.208  
 
8. Moral damages 
 
Moral damages are an elusive notion, that has been rejected for years by 
tribunals and only awarded in very few cases. One of the first cases involving moral 
damages was Lusitania in 1923. The case concerned a German submarine that was 
held responsible for sinking the British cruise liner Lusitania during WWII, causing 
the death of 1.198 people, including 128 American citizens.209 The tribunal in 
Lusitania articulated as to moral damages the following:  
 
„that one injured is, under the rules of international law, entitled to be 
compensated for an injury inflicted resulting in mental suffering, injury to his feelings, 
humiliation, shame, degradation, loss of social position or injury to his credit or to his 
reputation, there can be no doubt, and such compensation should be commensurate to 
the injury. Such damages are very real, and the mere fact that they are difficult to 
measure or estimate by money standards makes them none the less real and affords no 
reason why the injured person should not be compensated therefor as compensatory 
damages, but not as a penalty.”210  
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The breakthrough in arbitral decisions came much later when in 2008 and 
2009 five tribunals awarded moral damages, most notably in Desert Line Projects the 
tribunal has awarded the Claimant with U.S.$1 million.211   
 
8.1. Types of wrongful acts compensable in moral damages 
 
There can be three types of wrongful acts that are recoverable by moral 
damages distinguished: (1) the denial of justice, (2) due process, and (3) arbitrary 
conduct.  
 
Denial of justice is a part of the fair and equitable treatment, a minimum 
standard of treatment under the international customary law.212 A host state is 
required to provide justice to the foreign investor. Denial of justice embodies a gross 
injustice and maladministration of justice.213 A gross justice would include  
 
“refusal of access to court to defend legal rights, refusal to decide, unreasonable 
day, politically dictated judgments, corruption, intimidation, fundamental breaches of 
due process and decisions so outrageous as to be inexplicable otherwise than as 
expressions of arbitrariness or gross impotence.”214 
 
Therefore, a requisite of gross justice would not be fulfilled in a case of a 
simple misunderstanding, error, or misapplication of the law.215 In Mondev the 
tribunal noted that in its view a denial of justice must be “clearly improper and 
discreditable.”216 The tribunal In Pezold v. Zimbabwe found the denial of justice as an 
additional reason for awarding moral damages.217 
 
Due process is closely linked to denial of justice, as they both are elements of 
the fair and equitable treatment. Due process can be defined as “course of legal 
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proceedings according to rules and principles that have been established in a system of jurisprudence 
for the enforcement and protection of private rights.“218  
 
A requirement of due process is a notice of an intended submission and a 
chance to contest such submission before an impartial tribunal.219 An obligation to 
provide due process can found for example in Article n.1105 of the NAFTA treaty. 
This compels the host state to allow the foreign investor a hearing to discuss a permit 
submission and admits the investor to appear before a court or an administrative 
body to present evidence.220 
 
Lastly, arbitrary conduct has been described in ELSI as “a willful disregard of due 
process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety.”221 Arbitrary 
conduct occurs when there is no rational link between a measure or conduct and an 
alleged purpose or goal of such measure or conduct.222  Thus, arbitrary conduct lack 
rationality and legitimacy. However, the tribunal in Glamis Gold found that a “mere 
arbitrariness” is not enough, and that “something that is surprising, shocking, or exhibits a 
manifest lack of reasoning” is needed.223 
 
8.2. Definition of moral damages 
 
The elusiveness of moral damages has long been related to the lack of a clear 
definition of the term. It has been merely referred to as the reverse of the so-called 
“material damages”, till a clearer definition has been presented by the ILC 
commentaries.  
 
According to the ILC Articles, material damages encompass “damages to property 
or other interests of the State and its nationals which is assessable in financial terms.“224 Whereas 
they define the moral damages as “generally understood to encompass loss of loved ones, pain 
and suffering as well as the affront to sensibilities associated with an intrusion on the person, home 
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or private life.”225 Furthermore, Article n.31 sets the ground for moral damages. It says, 
that “injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful 
act of a State.“226  
 
A more elaborate definition was brought by Professor Wittich. He defines 
non-material damages, the term he uses for moral damages, as follows: 
 
(1) “It includes personal injury that does not produce loss of income or generate financial 
expenses.  
(2) It comprises the various forms of emotional harm, such as indignity, humiliation, 
shame, defamation, injury to reputation and feelings, but also harm resulting from 
the loss of loved ones and, on a more general basis, from the loss of enjoyment of life.  
(3) Non-material damage of a “pathological” character, such as mental stress, anguish, 
anxiety, pain, suffering, stress, nervous strain, fright, fear, threat or shock.  
(4) Non-material damage would also cover minor consequences of a wrongful act, e.g., 
the affront associated with the mere fact of a breach or, as it is sometimes called, 
“legal injury.”227  
 
Even though these definitions distinguish moral damages from material 
damages, the real difference is sometimes hasty, since “non-material damage to the 
individual is the inevitable consequence of, and inseparably linked to, physical damage.”228 Even 
the ILC Articles provide, that both material and non-material damages that result 
from international wrongful act “will be financially assessable and hence covered by the remedy 
of compensation.”229 That could indicate, that satisfaction might also be payable in 
money. Lastly, the ILC Articles deliver the notion that damages for financial losses 
are compensation, and therefore mandatory, as a minimum that such loss has not 
been remedied by restitution. On the other hand, with moral damages the ILC 
Articles associate discretion.230  
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8.3. Types of moral damages 
 
Experts distinguish between three main types of moral damages231 according 
to their nature. First, there is the moral or non-material harm done to the personality 
rights of individuals.232 The ILC Articles provides examples, such as “the loss of loved 
ones, pain and suffering as well as the affront to sensibilities associated with an intrusion on the 
person, home or private life.”233 These moral damages can in theory only suffer natural 
persons.234 Second, there is the moral damage resulted from “loss of reputation or credit 
as distinct from purely material loss.”235 And third, the legal damage as a result of a breach 
of legal obligations, regardless of any material harm that has been caused.236  
 
As to the second type of moral damages, the loss of reputation is the most 
discussed type of moral damages in the context of investment arbitrations. The loss 
of reputation is viewed as “a non-pecuniary loss that could only be redressed by way of moral 
damages.”237 There are two sorts of cases to be differentiated. Firstly, the loss of 
reputation as a standard consequential loss bared by an investor after an infringement 
of a treaty by a host State.238 Secondly, the loss of reputation of a host State, that is 
harmed by malicious prosecution instigated by an investor.239  
 
Moral damages can further be differentiated in regards to whom they can be 
claimed by. Firstly, moral damages may be requested by foreign investors. In 
LAFICO v Burundi an ad hoc tribunal held, that the actions of the Burundi 
government instigated severe harm to the “reputation and honor of LAFICO”240 and 
therefore constituted an international unlawful act.241 On such basis, the tribunal 
pronounced satisfaction for LAFICO as a legal body as the appropriate remedy.242 
Secondly, moral damages requested by States. The possibility of a State to request 
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moral damages has been discussed in many cases, such as Cementownia or Europe 
Cement. More on this topic in the chapter on the evolution of cases involving moral 
damages. 
 
8.4. Moral damages and punitive damages 
 
Furthermore, a concept of punitive damages can be discussed in association 
with moral damages. In private law, there is a clear distinction between punitive 
damages and moral damages. Moral damages serve to grant compensation for non-
pecuniary losses.243 Punitive damages’ primary function is to deter analogous 
behavior in the future.244  
 
Punitive damages hence operate mainly as a punishment for wrongful actions 
and not as compensation to a harmed party. Or additionally to “actual compensatory 
damages when the defendant acted with recklessness, malice, deceit, or other reprehensible conduct 
(e.g. violence, oppression, fraud . . .).”245 
 
In Wilkes v Wood the court rendered that:  
 
“damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but 
likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future 
and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself.“246 
 
Nevertheless, moral damages are usually not awarded to punish the offender, 
but rather to compensate the harmed party. Moral damages thus serve to recover 
damages to non-economic interests.247  
 
Awarding punitive damages varies upon the different legal systems, whereas 
in Common Law jurisdictions they are usually granted, the Civil Law systems are less 
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willing to award them.248 In international investment arbitrations, such clear 
differentiation as in civil law does not exist. There are no set rules on in which cases 
to award punitive damages or not. It is up to the tribunal to analyze the applicable 
investment treaty in every case. Some BITs unambiguously exclude the option of 
granting punitive damages249 while other BITs are silent on such matters.250 In such 
cases, where the BIT does not provide guidance in connection to punitive damages, 
tribunals shall give exceptional consideration to the national attitudes of the 
particular Contracting States.251 
 
Tribunals are even less willing to award punitive damages than moral damages. 
The CMS v. Argentina tribunal denied the claim for punitive damages and moreover 
noted the categorical rejection of such damages in the ILC Articles n. 38.252 In 
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia the tribunal cited Amoco decision that “the damage sustained is 
the measure of the reparation, and there is no indication that punitive damages could be 
considered.”253 
 
8.5. Forms of reparation 
 
The forms of reparation for moral damages differ from the general theory. 
The difference is due to their particular nature. The method of reparation for moral 
damages is contingent on whether the damage disturbed the state “directly” or through 
one of “its nationals.”254 However, restitution is not appropriate for moral damages255 
and satisfaction is suitable only for moral damages suffered by a state, as stated by 
ILC Articles, “those injuries, not financially assessable, which amount to an affront to the 
State.”256  
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Satisfaction is not considered to be a standard form of reparation.257 It is 
envisioned to guarantee a harmed State full reparation in conformity with 
international law.258 It is still “generally considered the remedy par excellence in cases of non-
material damage”259 in a case in which an injured State cannot achieve restitution or 
compensation.260 In those cases, moral damages serve primarily emblematic or legal 
character. They do not “result in any material loss or injury but is limited to the non-material 
injury arising from the very fact of the breach of the international obligation itself.”261  
 
Examples of satisfaction can be found in the ILC Article n.37, and are namely: 
“an acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate 
modality.”262 The most common type of satisfaction is a declaration of the 
wrongfulness of an act by a competent body of law.263  
 
Besides satisfaction in a form of declaratory relief, satisfaction can be 
monetary as well. The ILC Articles note that “monetary payments may be called for by way 
of satisfaction under article 37, but they perform a function distinct from that of compensation.”264 
The ICJ in Rainbow Warrior awarded both satisfaction and monetary compensation 
for an injury suffered by the state itself.265 
 
8.6. Evolution of cases involving moral damages  
 
Awarding non-material damages is not that common as awarding material 
damages in international investment arbitrations. Since the Lusitania case in 1923, 
tribunals have dealt with claims for moral damages in various instances. Most 
tribunals facing such claims have not awarded moral damages, nonetheless, no 
tribunal has straight forward dismissed a case of compensation for moral damages, 
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although in Helnan v Egypt the tribunal has chosen not to tackle the accusation 
brought by the Claimant.266  
 
The tribunal in Funnekotter v Zimbabwe has dismissed the claim on the grounds 
of a late filing.267 In Zhinvali Development268 and in Generation Ukraine tribunals have 
rendered no jurisdiction over the disputes, stating that their jurisdictions ”were limited 
to BIT breaches“.269 Similarly, in Biloune the tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction over 
a case of “human rights violations” and found that the claim presented was outside of 
ICSID jurisdiction.270  
 
Tribunals in Pey Casado271, Biwater272 and Europe Cement273 have rendered that 
the claims presented before them lacked sufficient evidence and therefore they 
dismissed the cases. Similarly, in Tecmed v Mexico the tribunal rejected the case due to 
insufficient evidence, though it noted that moral damages could be awarded if they 
“affected the Claimant’s reputation and therefore caused the loss of business opportunities for the 
Claimant.”274 Insufficient evidence has been found in Benvenuti as well, however, the 
tribunal has awarded a small amount of damages based on “ex aequo et bono” grounds 
(in accordance with Article n.42 para.3 of the ICSID Convention).275  
 
In Cementownia the tribunal stated that Turkey’s claim for moral damages could 
be compensated by satisfaction in the form of a “declaration that the claimant’s proceedings 
were fraudulent”.276 This, in the views of the tribunal, would afford Turkey satisfaction 
for any damage to its reputation it had suffered.277 However, the tribunal continued 
that it “deems more appropriate to sanction the Claimant with respect to the allocation of costs.”278 
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The reasoning is that the Claimant’s misbehavior took place during the proceedings 
and therefore:  
 
“tribunals applying international law may award to a State the remedy of 
satisfaction where it has suffered an intangible injury, such as injury to its reputation or 
prestige. In investment treaty cases, compensation has been awarded where the injury 
was inflicted maliciously.” 279 
 
Finally, the tribunal in Desert Line Projects allowed the claim for moral damages 
and awarded them, making this case very prominent.280 The claim in Desert Line 
Projects involved a construction company, that built roads in Yemen for which it has 
not been properly paid.281 In 2004 a construction site has been disturbed by 15 armed 
individuals demanding payments of unpaid invoices, threatening the company’s 
employees, and even opening fire with automatic weapons. Some personnel also 
received personal threats.282 The company brought a claim before a domestic court 
for unpaid contracts, which resulted in a settlement of U.S.$20 million.283 Such 
settlement thou has been much lower than proposed by the tribunal and the Claimant 
had complained that it has been harassed into taking it. Later, the tribunal concluded 
that the settlement “was imposed onto the Claimant under physical and financial duress”284 
and was “not the result of fair and sincere negotiation among the parties.”285  
 
The tribunal rendered Respondent’s conduct as a violation of the duty to 
provide “fair and equitable treatment” under the BIT286 and that the settlement breached 
the Respondent’s responsibilities under the BIT.287 Upon that,  the tribunal first 
stated that the Respondent had “not questioned the possibility for the Claimant to obtain 
moral damages in the context of ICSID procedure.”288 The tribunal recognized that the fact 
                                                 
279 Cementownia, para. 165. 
280 Desert Line Projects, p. 69.  
281 Desert Line Projects, para. 5-11. 
282 Desert Line Projects, para. 19-20. 
283 Desert Line Projects, p. 69.  
284 Desert Line Projects, para. 16 
285 Desert Line Projects, para 186. 
286 Ibidem. 
287 Desert Line Projects, para. 193. 
288 Desert Line Projects, para. 289.  
 44 
that BIT’s “primarily aim at protecting property and economic values”289 does not “exclude, as 
such, that a party may, in exceptional circumstances, ask for compensation for moral damages.”290  
 
The tribunal also noted that “it is generally accepted in most legal systems that moral 
damages may also be recovered besides pure economic damages”291 and that “it knows that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to substantiate a prejudice of the kind ascertained in the present 
award.”292 With regards to valuation moral damages, the tribunal rendered that it was 
“generally recognized that a legal person (as opposed to a natural person) may be awarded moral 
damages, including loss of reputation, in specific circumstances only.”293  
 
On such basis, the tribunal established that Yemen has breached the BIT and 
stated that “the physical duress exerted on the executives of the Claimant, was malicious and 
therefore constitutive of a fault-based liability.”294 It found Yemen liable and ordered Yemen 
to compensate for “moral damages, including loss of reputation” in the amount of U.S.$1 
million.295 
 
The noteworthy acknowledgment, in this case, has been the tribunal stating 
that the Claimant had “suffered a significant injury to its credit and reputation and lost its 
prestige”296 and that the tribunal unambiguously accepted that an “injury to a corporation’s 
credit, reputation and prestige is a form of moral damage that can be compensated in an award.”297 
But what has had an even bigger impact was that the tribunal awarded monetary 
compensation to the company to recover the harm  “physical persons” have suffered.298 
Such decision has been centered on the fact that  “executives suffered the stress and anxiety 
of being harassed, threatened and detained.”299 The tribunal, therefore, held, that the 
psychological suffering of the officers has directly resulted from physical actions, 
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such as physical duress, coercion, interference, or intimidation conducted by armed 
forces.300  
 
The issue in such statement is that the state’s wrongful actions do not cause 
direct damages to the company itself, the legal entity, but only to physical persons. 
That would mean, that the physical persons, in this case, the executives, would need 
to claim their moral damages in distinct proceedings. However, for such proceedings, 
the tribunal would lack jurisdiction since it would not most likely fall under the term 
“investment” set out in the BIT.301  
 
The tribunal in Desert Line Projects has therefore confirmed the principle 
established in ILC Articles, that compensation in comparison to satisfaction can be 
awarded to both natural and legal persons. A different view came from the tribunal 
in Pey Casado. The tribunal there rendered a somewhat contentious decision stating 
that “monetary compensation for material damage awarded to a foreign investor for treaty breach 
and a declaration of liability could also be considered as sufficient satisfaction for an individual in 
the context of a moral damages claim.”302 The tribunal there noted that it viewed the mere 
award as sufficient and substantial moral satisfaction.303 
 
Since Desert Line Projects there were more than 15 cases that faced claims for 
moral damages.304 Namely Lemire v Ukraine, Arif v Moldova, Pezold v Zimbabwe and Al-
Kharafi v Libya. The tribunal in Al-Kharafi v Libya has awarded Claimants moral 
damages in an unparalleled amount of U.S.$ 30 million for a loss of reputation.305 
 
Lemire v. Ukraine was the first case, where the tribunal has decisively set a 
definition of “exceptional circumstances.” The case concerned a US national, Mr. Lemire, 
that invested in radio broadcasting in Ukraine and later accused radio broadcasting 
authorities in Ukraine of unfair rejections of his radio frequencies.306 Mr. Lemire 
claimed that he had experienced two types of harms that were incited by Ukraine’s 
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procedures for awarding radio licenses: “(1) the disproportionate and excessive efforts which 
Claimant had to incur in the preparation of applications and (2) the disrespect and humiliation 
caused by the constant rejections.”307 
 
The tribunal, however, found that “excessive or disproportionate efforts which an 
applicant may have incurred when requesting administrative licenses, by their nature, are most 
unlikely to give rise to moral damages, since the injury does not meet any of the three standards 
required for the existence of moral damages.”308 
 
Following Lemire v Ukraine the tribunal in Pezold v Zimbabwe has used its test to 
assess the claim for moral damages. The claim for moral damages in this case related 
to threats, violence, stress, and anxiety inflicted by illegal settlers on their land.309 
Unfortunately, the tribunal misused the Lemire v Ukraine test and therefore granted 
wrongfully moral damages in a sum of U.S.$1 million.310 The decision was later 
annulled. 
 
8.7. Threshold for moral damages 
 
There is no set threshold for awarding moral damages, which poses a risk of 
disproportion among various tribunals. A lack of an acknowledged threshold also 
actively demonstrates, that every tribunal requires a different level of proof of a grave 
action. In Siag v Egypt the tribunal held that awarding moral damages shall be reserved 
for “extreme cases of egregious behavior.”311 It added that it rejects the claim for so-called 
“enhanced damages” and that in its view moral and punitive damages both demand 
proves of “exceptional circumstances.”312 The tribunal in Europe Cement stated that moral 
damages are intended for “exceptional circumstances such as physical duress.”313  
 
The Biwater dissent stated that when a States “deliberately conducts itself in a manner 
it knows at the time to be wrongful, disregarding the basic legal rights and protections of private 
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parties“314 such behavior triggers moral damages. In Desert Line Projects the tribunal did 
not expressly set a threshold, but merely stated that “party may, in exceptional 
circumstances, ask for compensation for moral damages.“315 It continued referring to  
Lusitania, which held that moral damages are “no less very real and should be 
compensated.”316  
 
It is clear that the lack of set threshold poses real risks. Some believe that 
moral damages shall be only awarded in egregious or expectational circumstances. 
That would require an advanced standard for moral damages claims in comparison 
to claims for other types of compensatory damage. However, setting the standard 
that high might mean that actions that inflict mental sufferings to an individual in a 
form of humiliation, shame, loss of social position, or else, could simply slip away.317 
According to Professor Ripinsky, thou, egregious or expectational circumstances 
simply indicate the distinctiveness of moral damages and consequently give a specific 
nature to investment treaties.318  
 
The tribunal in Biwater pronounced a requirement of causality in connection 
to moral damages. The tribunal there noted that in its view “causing injury means more 
than simply the wrongful act itself“319 and that there needs to be a causal link between the 
BIT breach and the claim for moral damages, which it lacked to find.320  
 
In contrast to the Biwater award, the dissenting opinion addressed the concept 
put forward in the ILC Articles that implies “the no-fault nature of moral damages at 
customary international law.” The Biwater dissent stated that:  
 
“[While the Claimant] did not demonstrate a quantifiable monetary loss, it did 
demonstrate an unacceptable breach of fundamental international rights and protections. 
In my view, that breach demands a remedy beyond merely declaring it a violation of the 
relevant BIT. The Republic’s conduct caused moral damages.” 
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The tribunal in Lemire v Ukraine created a test that allowed to assess the 
causality. It noted that “if it can be proven, that in the normal course of events a certain cause 
will produce a certain effect, it can be safely assumed that a (rebuttable) presumption of causality 
between both events exists and that the first is the proximate cause of the other.”321 In addition, 
the tribunal noted that it requires a chain of causality to be proximate.322  
 
The premise of Europe Cement and Cementownia is that “the moral harm claimed by 
the State was the reputational damage of fraudulent claims, overlapping with abuse of process.”323 
The tribunal in Cementownia dissented in opinion from Desert Line Projects when noted 
that it viewed the definition of abuse of process as presented in Desert Line Projects as 
overly general. It stated that it was hesitant that such a broad principle could 
constitute a sufficient legal base when granting compensation for moral damages.324 
 
That can be observed when the tribunals transformed satisfaction into an 
allocation of costs. Additionally, in tribunals’ understandings both awards were 
punitive for the Claimant and at the same time compensatory for the Respondent.325 
Such methods basically by-pass moral damages by choosing an alternate punitive 
course of the cost’s allocation.326 Therefore, such decisions essentially distorted the 
difference between moral and punitive damages, similarly as in Generation Ukraine, 
where the Claimant requested for “moral (punitive) damages.”327 Similarly, in Siag v Egypt 
the tribunal failed to differentiate between moral and punitive damages.328 
 
On contrary, the dissenting opinion in Biwater pursued to “use allocation of costs 
as a compensatory measure of moral damages where quantum is difficult to ascertain.”329 
Following the rulings in Lusitania, that the struggle to determine the value of moral 
damages shall not lessen the right to compensation for a non-State Claimant.330 The 
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dissenting opinion further noted that “the fact that an award of damages often involves a 
considerable discretionary element does not mean that it is punitive in character.”331  
 
In Lemire v Ukraine the tribunal asked the question if moral damages could be 
awarded in the case even without the Claimant making allegations of physical 
duress.332 The tribunal there adopted the rulings from Desert Line Projects but noted 
that the tribunal in Desert Line Projects had proposed an insufficient definition of 
“exceptional circumstances.”333  
 
Thus, the tribunal in Lemire v Ukraine proposed more elaborate steps in 
assessing whether or not to award moral damages. It added that the definition “must 
be induced from existing case law.”334 It stated that moral damages shall be awarded in 
exceptional circumstances if:  
 
(1) “the State’s actions imply physical threat, illegal detention or other analogous 
situations in which the ill-treatment contravenes the norms according to which 
civilized nations are expected to act;  
(2) the State’s actions cause a deterioration of health, stress, anxiety, other mental 
suffering such as humiliation, shame and degradation, or loss of reputation, credit 
and social position; and  
(3) both cause and effect are grave or substantial.“335  
 
Lemire v Ukraine tribunal thus put forward a notion that restricts moral 
damages to exceptional circumstances, when a cause is grave, and the effect is 
extensive. This test has been cited in various cases, such as Tza Yap Shum v Peru.336 It 
put emphasis on the effect it had on a foreign investor. The tribunal in order to award 
moral damages has to demonstrate that State’s actions had resulted in health 
deterioration, stress, anxiety, or other mental sufferings.337 Such moral damages 
though have to be substantial, in the words of Lemire v Ukraine tribunal, 
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extraordinary.338 The issue with such wording is that the substantiality of the moral 
damage differs according to each case. 
This test renders fundamentally moral damages as a notion connected to 
natural persons. That’s due to the nature of the defined damages since physical 
threats or detentions appear to be impossible to be done against a legal person or 
capital.339 The only type of moral damages that seems to enjoy a practical foundation 
for awarding moral damages to a legal entity is reputational harm.340 
 
The tribunal in Arif v Moldova has picked up on the Lemire v Ukraine definition 
of exceptional circumstances and adhered to such a high threshold. According to the 
tribunal to award moral damages it has to “determine whether in the case at hand the conduct 
of Respondent and the suffering of Claimant have been so grave and substantial, as to amount to 
such exceptional circumstances that necessitate a pecuniary compensation for moral damages.”341 
 
The tribunal held that “the conduct of the Moldovan authorities provoked stress and 
anxiety to Claimant.”342 However, it noted, that “the different actions did not reach a level of 
gravity and intensity which would allow it to conclude that there were exceptional circumstances which 
would entail the need for a pecuniary compensation for moral damages.”343 Therefore, the 
tribunal dismissed the claim for moral damages. 
 
The tribunal in Arif v Moldova has articulated a very interesting point on the 
case Lemire v Ukraine. It stated that Lemire v Ukraine decision has been centered on a 
partial debate of three cases, but it lacked broader deliberation upon underlying 
values.344 It added that “the statement might serve as a summary of the issues in these cases, but 
it should not be taken as a cumulative list of criteria that must be demonstrated for an award of 
moral damages.”345 Specific circumstances of the Desert Line Projects case shall be taken 
into account and shall not be applied as a single definition of the accessibility of 
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moral damages as a remedy.346 It followed that in its view, the Lusitania case properly 
expresses the criteria tribunals shall take into consideration.  
 
It stressed that tribunals enjoy an element of discretion, nevertheless “the 
element of exceptionality must be acknowledged and respected.”347 In such a position the 
tribunal rendered the following: 
 
“A pecuniary premium for compensation for such sentiment, in addition to the 
compensation of economic damages, would have an enormous impact on the system of 
contractual and tortious relations. It would systematically create financial advantages 
for the victim which go beyond the traditional concept of compensation. The fundamental 
balance of the allocation of risks would be distorted.”348  
 
The Tribunal has consequently associated itself with the preponderant 
opinion that compensation for moral damages shall only be awarded in exceptional 
cases, whilst the conduct of the perpetrator, as well as a prejudice of a victim, are 
grave and substantial.349 The tribunal in Lahoud v Congo quoted the decision in Arif v 
Moldova when stating the need for expectational circumstances to be present.350  
 
8.8. Valuation of moral damages 
 
ILC Article n.31 puts forward a concept that there is “an obligation to make full 
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”351 The injury according to 
the ILC Articles includes “any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally 
wrongful act of a State.”352 In combination with ILC Article n.34, which requires a “full 
reparation”, it sets the ground for valuating moral damages.  
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Moral damages offer a type of monetary compensation for intangible, thou 
still real damages, as far as they can be monetarily assessable.353 The tribunal in 
Lusitania held that:  
 
“the impossibility of computing damages with precision in such cases furnishes 
no reason the wrongdoer should escape repairing his wrong or why he who has suffered 
should not receive reparation therefor measured by rules as nearly approximating 
accuracy as human ingenuity can devise.”354 
 
The ILC Article n. 31 allows moral damages, as far as there is no doubt the 
harm comprises any material or moral damage caused by a breach.355 There is no 
general obligation under international law for the harmed party to have suffered 
material loss or damage when seeking the reparation for a breach, thou a real loss or 
injury is of the highest prominence to conclude the form and amount of 
reparation.356 Moral damages are evaluated whether or not they fall under the 
definition of financial assessability set in the ILC Article n.36. If they fulfill the criteria 
they shall be compensated in monetary standards as any other compensatory 
damages.357 
 
Quantification of moral damages is rather challenging due to their vague and 
ambiguous nature and a lack of guidelines. The tribunal in Lusitania merely noted 
that moral damages can be granted as “reasonable compensation for such mental suffering or 
shock, if any, caused by the violent severing of family ties, as claimant may actually have sustained 
by reason of such death.“358  
 
The lack of standards could trigger very distinct valuations of one claim by 
various tribunals. For example, the tribunal in Desert Line Projects valued the claim to 
U.S.$ 1 million359, thou another tribunal could easily assess the same claim only to 
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U.S.$ 100.000. Therefore, tribunals have to carefully consider the fairness and 
reasonableness of the valued claim and their proposed compensation.360  
 
In Desert Line Projects tribunal recognized that moral damages were “difficult to 
measure or estimate by money standards”361 and even stated that the sum awarded was 
“more than symbolic yet modest in proportion to the vastness of the project.”362 Usually, tribunals 
enjoy a great deal of discretion and flexibility to decide the appropriate amount that 
the harmed investor shall be compensated with.363 Tribunals in Desert Line Projects and 
in Benvenuti have both awarded moral damages without any real financial assessment, 
meaning the tribunals have not referenced any proven financial losses. Tribunals 
have not given much consideration to inflation as of the date of the award, either.364 
Similarly, in the tribunal S.S. I'm Alone ordered the United States to not only formally 
apologize to the Canadian Government, but also instructed to pay U.S.$ 25.000 "as 
material amend in respect of the wrong it had committed.”365  
 
Nevertheless, it is not that no guidelines exist. The United Nation 
Compensation Committee has proposed strict rules on compensating personal 
injuries and mental pains and anguishes. For example, the ceiling amount for a 
spouse, child, or parent of a deceased individual has been set to U.S.$15.000 per 
individual or U.S.$30.000 per family.366 
 
Even without such specific guidelines, tribunals have means to help them 
assess moral damages. Some forms of “mental injury” are fairly straightforwardly 
assessable since the valuation can be based on real tangible medical expenses.367 
Tribunals in their discretion to assess damages can take into consideration the state’s 
wrongful behavior. According to experts, it would be challenging to deem that “fault 
in any degree could not be deemed to be—de lege lata or ferenda—of some relevance in the 
determination of the consequences of an internationally wrongful act.”368 In case that fault is 
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present, “the degree of willful intent or negligence play some role in the determination of the degree 
of responsibility and therefore of the forms and degrees of the reparation due.”369  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the gravity of the offense that a state has 
committed, and its degree of responsibility can play a role in assessing the amount of 
damages the tribunal would award. In case of malicious conduct, the tribunal could 
consider such conduct “as an aggravating circumstance increasing the amount of damages 
due.”370 An ad hoc Commission has in the case Letelier and Moffitt awarded more than 
U.S.$1 million in compensation for moral damages to three individuals and their 
inheritors.371 The Commission held that “in considering the compensation for moral damages 
it had taken into account the significant steps undertaken by the Chilean Government and Congress 
to remedy human rights problems as well as the efforts undertaken towards financial reparation at 
the domestic level for families of victims.”372  
 
8.9. Challenges facing moral damages 
 
Tribunals when awarding moral damages face various challenges and 
obstacles. A lack of set rulings and discrepancies in arbitral decisions raises numerous 
questions, such as the question of jurisdiction. As mentioned above, few tribunals 
have dismissed cases on basis of a lack of jurisdiction. In these cases, where tribunals 
declared no jurisdiction, they denied the claims raised by states for monetary 
compensation for moral damage arising from deceitful proceedings instigated by 
foreign investors.373 The reasoning behind these decisions is that BITs provide legal 
protections for foreign investors against the actions of the host state and not for the 
host state against the actions of investors.374  
 
The Article n.25 of the ICSID Convention pronounces the requirement that 
a claim must arise directly out of an investment. The tribunals in Generation Ukraine375 
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and Biloune376 rejected moral damages claims because they found them outside of the 
scope of the definition of an investment in the relevant BIT. In Amco Asia the 
tribunal, similarly, found the issue in that Indonesia’s tax fraud counterclaim has not 
arisen directly out of an investment as defined by the relevant BIT.377 Conversely, 
the tribunal in Desert Line Projects378 rendered jurisdiction.  
 
Tribunals in Cementownia379 and Limited Liability noted that they “were not 
presented any basis in this applicable law“.380 The Cementownia tribunal, although noted, 
that “there is nothing in the ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules and Additional Facility which 
prevents an arbitral tribunal from granting moral damages.“381 Thus, the question of 
jurisdiction remains open and it is up to each tribunal to consider whether it has 
jurisdiction in a particular case or not. 
 
A burden of proof in claims for moral damages in arbitrations varies from 
what the ICJ adjudicated. In Diallo the court held that “non-material injury can be 
established even without specific evidence”.382 Nonetheless, tribunals dismissed cases on 
numerous instances for a lack of substantiated or proven evidence.383 Tribunals when 
evaluating tend to rely on the “balance of probabilities” standard.384 
 
Another issue raised by tribunals on Desert Line Projects and Cementownia is 
“fault-based liability“, meaning if fault or malice is a required condition for awarding 
moral damages. Tribunal in Desert Line Projects referred to “physical duress exerted on the 
executives of the Claimant was malicious and therefore constitutive of a fault-based liability.“385 
Similarly, the tribunal in Cementownia contended that “in investment treaty cases, 
compensation has been awarded where the injury was inflicted maliciously.”386  
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Nonetheless, the general doctrine does not oblige an element of fault to be 
present in order to meet the threshold for moral damages. The ILC Articles do not 
intent to define moral damages through fault-based liability. On the contrary, they 
propose moral damages as no-fault based and compensatory.387 It is commonly 
acknowledged that a state’s intentions are not relevant in evaluations of allegations 
of BIT breaches.388  
 
The tribunal in Occidental Exploration stated that “this is an objective requirement 
that does not depend on whether the Respondent has proceeded in good faith or not.“389 
Correspondingly, the tribunal in CMS v Argentina related the state’s intentions as 
“objective requirement unrelated to whether the Respondent has had any deliberate intention or bad 
faith in adopting the measures in question.“390 The tribunal has further added that “of course, 
such intention and bad faith can aggravate the situation but are not an essential element of the 
standard.“391  
 
Such rulings imply that intention and bad faith are not mandatory to be proven 
in order to meet the threshold. Nonetheless, it does not mean that the intent is not 
considered when evaluating the state’s responsibility.392 The bad faith yet could still 
most possibly play a role in awarding moral damages, since tribunals are more 
confident in awarding moral damages if the intent of deliberate reprehensible actions 
is proven.393 Bad faith as well as in awarding moral damages could influence the 




The topic of damages and in particular moral damages entails numerous 
questions still unanswered. The value and valuation of damages remain a very 
dynamic issue, with more challenges to come in the future. At the beginning of the 
thesis I proposed two questions: 1) what the methods of reparation of damages are, 
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and (2) what moral damages are and how their methods of reparation differ from the 
general methods. 
As for the first question, notwithstanding the sizeable advancement in 
accepting the legal standards and economic valuation methods, the discussion still 
remains open and, in many instances, heavily lays on the discretion of the tribunal. 
A valuation is not an exact science and will never produce perfect results and the 
absolutely objective true value of an object. However, that shall not prevent tribunals 
from applying the different methods of valuation. The value of investment simply 
lays further, not in a simple solution that suits all cases.  
 
Nevertheless, tribunals shall not forget that law requires a certain degree of 
predictability and consistency. When assessing claims for damages, tribunals need to 
take into consideration standards and principles that have become broadly accepted. 
One such standard that has crystallized in the past few years is evaluating businesses 
that are going concern by using the DCF method. Another standard widely 
acknowledged is assessing an expropriated asset using fair market value at the time 
of the expropriation. All these standards purely allow foreign investors that have 
been harmed by the host state to receive fair and full reparation for their lost assets. 
It further benefits the investment arbitration itself, as it minimalizes discrepancies 
and discrimination between decisions on the same or similar merit.  
 
The thesis has demonstrated the importance for the tribunal to evaluate the 
circumstance of the particular case in order to assess damages the harmed party has 
suffered. Each case with its distinctive specifications requires a different approach. 
Not all cases are suitable for the DCF method, even though it still remains the most 
used approach. A valuation entails a deep knowledge of facts and a professional 
judgment when it comes to evaluating those facts.  
 
And as to the second question, moral damages, despite new progressive 
rulings of some tribunals, namely for example in Desert Line Projects, are still lacking 
in acceptance. The thesis has demonstrated, that unfortunately, the main view on 
moral damages remains restrictive. Setting the threshold for moral damages as high 
as the majority of tribunals does is dangerous. It is especially worrying in cases where 
the harmed party has prevailed on the merits.  
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Requiring fault-based liability sets a precarious precedent. A fault and intent 
shall only be taken into consideration when assessing the value of moral damages, 
they shall not be a requirement of liability. The very shattered jurisprudence on moral 
damages poses s real risk. Tribunals should by any means prevent the abuse of law 
when it comes to the refusal to award moral damages except in egregious 
circumstances.  
 
A full reparation standard shall not be forgotten when it comes to moral 
damages. Tribunals find issues when it comes to awarding full reparation for moral 
damages for various reasons. Firstly, the problem lays with the fact, that moral 
damages can be repaired via satisfaction, such as a declaration, but also through 
monetary satisfaction. Secondly, the concern of many tribunals is whether or not a 
legal person can claim and can be awarded for moral damage that has been suffered 
by its agents. Moreover, there is the issue of whether states can claim reparation for 
moral damages that they have suffered on their reputation. And lastly, there is the 
dispute on the difference between moral and punitive damages. 
 
When awarding moral damages tribunals should leave the restrictive approach 
in the past. The jurisprudence has shown that moral damages are real and shall be 
compensated. I hope that the thesis has been able to demonstrate the issues that 
moral damages faced in the past and are facing today and I hope that the 
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Abstrakt v slovenskom jazyku 
 
Medzinárodné investičné arbitráže sú novým a dynamickým faktorom 
súčasnej globálnej ekonómie a náhrada škody predstavuje jednu z ich hlavných 
charakteristík, peňažný aspekt. Medzinárodné investičné arbitráže prostredníctvom 
medzinárodných investičných dohôd chránia strany dohody, štát a investora 
druhého zmluvného štátu. Potreba náhrady škody poškodenej strane je 
bezprostredná, aj keď hodnota investície a ocenenie náhrady škody nie je zakotvené 
v dvojstranných investičných dohodách. Z toho dôvodu je dôležité stanoviť 
štandardy a princípy, ktorých by sa tribunál mohol pri rozhodovaní držať. Na druhú 
stranu, je však potrebné zachovať voľné uváženie tribunálu, pretože ocenenie škody 
závisí na okolnostiach jednotlivých prípadov. 
 
Uznávané pravidlá sú základom predchádzania rozdielov a diskriminácie, a to 
hlavne z dôvodu častého udeľovania náhrady škody v miliónoch či miliardách 
amerických dolárov. Cieľom náhrady škody je zaistiť úplnú náhradu poškodenej 
strane. Predtým, však tribunál musí zistiť hodnotu investície a následne vypočítať 
náhradu škody použitím jednotlivých metód oceňovania.  
 
Práca si kladie za cieľ skúmať jednotlivé metódy oceňovania investícií, a 
metódy oceňovania, ktoré využívajú tribunály pri oceňovaní poškodeného majetku. 
Každá z metód oceňovania je vhodná v odlišných okolnostiach, preto je potrebné, 
aby tribunál využil znalosti faktov prípadu a na tie aplikoval svoj najlepší úsudok. 
Cieľom každého tribunálu, by mala byť rovnocenná a úplná náhrada škody. 
 
Práca sa bude zaoberať aj náhradou nemajetkovej ujmy, ako jedného z typov 
škôd. Nemajetková ujma je konceptom novším a v prevažnej miere stále 
odmietaným. Aj napriek progresívnej judikatúre niektorých tribunálov, zostáva 
prístup k nemajetkovej ujme reštriktívny. Tribunály podmieňujú naplnenie znakov 
ujmy prísnymi pravidlami, čo predstavuje reálne nebezpečenstvo. Práca priblíži 
roztrieštenú judikatúru a niektoré z hlavných problémov, ktoré sa s ujmou spájajú. 
Zodpovie otázky ako napríklad: čo je to nemajetková ujma, kto môže žiadať náhradu 
ujmy a ako môže byť ujma kompenzovaná. Cieľom práce je priblížiť problémy 
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prístupu k nemajetkovej ujme v minulosti a v súčasnosti v nádeji, že sa judikatúra 
pomaly ale isto zmení k lepšiemu.  
 
Abstract in English language 
 
International investment arbitrations are an upcoming and dynamic factor 
within the current global economy, and damages embody one of their main 
characteristics, the monetary aspect. International investment arbitrations through 
International Investment Agreements protect both parties involved, a state and an 
investor on another state, that is a party to such agreement. The need to award 
damages to harmed parties to a dispute is imminent, even though the value and 
valuation of damages are not articulated in Bilateral Investment Treaties. Therefore, 
it is vital to set standards and principles that tribunals could adhere to when awarding 
damages. On the other hand, it is important to allow discretion, since the valuation 
of damages depends on the particular circumstances of each case.  
 
Acknowledged rules are fundamental to prevent discrepancies and 
discriminations, particularly when awards in international investment arbitrations can 
reach millions or even billions of U.S.$. The aim of damages is to provide full 
reparation standard when harm has been done to a party. In order to provide 
compensation to a harmed party, the tribunal first needs to assess the value of the 
affected investment and from that calculate the damages using a valuation method.  
 
The thesis will examine the different methods to assess the value of an 
investment, as well as the valuation approaches that tribunals use to evaluate the 
harmed business or asset. Each of the valuation methods is suitable for distinctive 
circumstances. Hence the tribunals need to entail a deep knowledge of facts and a 
professional judgment when evaluating those facts. A goal of every tribunal should 
be to provide the harmed party with fair and full reparation. 
 
The thesis will examine moral damages, as a particular type of damages. Moral 
damages are a more recent and still widely rejected concept. And despite new 
progressive rulings of some tribunals, the main view on moral damages remains 
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restrictive. Tribunals set the threshold for moral damages very high, which poses real 
risks to harmed parties. The thesis will observe the shattered jurisprudence and some 
of the main concerns the tribunals have when they are presented with a claim for 
moral damages. Questions such as: what moral damages are, who can claim moral 
damages, how moral damages are compensated, and others will be answered in the 
thesis. The aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the issues that moral damages faced 
in the past and are facing today in a hope that the jurisprudence will slowly but surely 
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